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This paper offers a purely structural characterisation of the content, limits 
and  contradictions  of  credit  relations  in  capitalist  accumulation. 
Considering  steady-state  evolutions  and  step-change  perturbations  in  a 
dynamic  model  of  the  Marxian  circuit  of  capital,  it  establishes  that 
sustained paces of net credit extension may boost aggregate profitability, 
the  rate  of  accumulation,  and  the  aggregate  financial  robustness  of 
capitalist  enterprises.  These  gains are  limited by  the  economy’s dynamic 
productive capacities, and  tempered by  the  risks of  credit  and monetary 
disruptions created  payment obligations established by credit. Economies 
with higher paces of net credit extension are shown to be more vulnerable to 
the  disruptions  to  accumulation  variously  emphasised  by  Marxian, 
Keynesian and Post-Keynesian contributions. 
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Any theorisation of contemporary capitalism, its instabilities and contradictions requires deliberate 
and  systematic  attention  to  credit  relations.  In  recent  decades  credit  flows  have  exhibited 
unprecedented  magnitude,  volatility  and,  arguably,  macroeconomic  significance.  In  the  US 
economy, the period between 1993 and 2007 saw the largest sustained post-war cycle of net credit 
extension to the private non-financial sector, increasing its indebtedness by more than 60 percentage 
points of GDP.1 Much of this lending doubtlessly inflated successive bubbles in financial and real-
estate asset prices across this period.2 But these flows also contributed to aggregate demand and 
thus to profitability, both directly and possibly through “wealth effects” associated with asset-price 
inflation. At the  same time  it was  the  “credit-crunch”  of 2007  and  the  near  freezing  of credit 
markets following  the Panic  of October 2008 that drove much of the world into recession. The 
anaemic recovery that followed may be understood to be conditioned by the ongoing  process of 
“deleveraging”, which has seen negative credit flows for the entire private non-financial sector of 
the US economy for the first time since World War II.
This paper advances a  dynamic,  integrated  analytical  approach  to  the  macroeconomic  content, 
limits  and  contradictions  of  credit  relations.  It  does  so  by  advancing  a  structural  model  of 
accumulation  and  credit  based  on  Marx’s  (1885)  circuit-of-capital  conceptualisation  of 
accumulation, its mathematical formalisation offered by Foley (1982, 1986), and on a more recently 
developed  approach to  the  monetary foundations and contradictions of  credit relations.3  In the 
resulting framework the driver of economic life is investment undertaken in the pursuit of monetary 
profits whose capitalisation is the fundamental source of growth. Capitalist profitability, in turn, is 
determined dynamically, in the sphere of commodity production by the generation of surplus value, 
and in the sphere of exchange by sales flows allowing the timely realisation of monetary profits.  
Credit relations are defined in the sphere of exchange, and their macroeconomic content arises in 
the  first instance  from their  role  in  conditioning  timely sales of  commodity output that realise 
monetary profits. They have  systematic  foundation  on  hoards of  value  in  monetary form  that 
develop in the circuit of capital and in the circuits of revenue of workers and capitalist consumers. 
1 From a cycle low of 115 percent of GDP in early 1994 to a peak of 177 percent of GDP in early 2009. Calculated from 
seasonably adjusted data in Flow of Funds of the United States. 
2 Such processes and the transfers of  value associated with them are another defining characteristic of  contemporary 
capitalism and require separate macroeconomic analysis and characterisation.
3 Deployed to the analysis of credit allocation in dos Santos (2011a) and more fully developed in dos Santos (2011b). Money hoards are understood  to support the  ex  nihilo issuance  of  bank liabilities by providing 
dynamic  scopes  for  their  circulation,  so  long  as  those  are  accepted  as  stores  of  value.  The 
acceptability of bank liabilities is most generally grounded on claims held in bank portfolios. The 
magnitude and distribution of existing money hoards relative to production and consumption plans 
conditions  the  demand  for  credit.  The  composition  in  which  holders  of  money are  willing  to 
maintain their holdings conditions the ability of the credit system to accommodate any given level 
of net credit extension demanded.  
<Figure 1 here>
The resulting structural framework yields a number of findings, which are formally presented and 
demonstrated as theorems within the model’s framework.  Like sustained own investment, sustained 
paces  of  net credit  extension  are  shown  to  boost  the  rate  of  accumulation  and  the  aggregate 
profitability of total social capital. This ability is ultimately constrained by the economy’s dynamic 
productive capacity. It is also uniquely tempered by the inherent credit and monetary risks posed by 
credit relations and the payment obligations they create. Those obligations render the profit realised 
by enterprises net of debt servicing  costs into the concrete imperative governing  decisions over 
investment, credit demand, and its accommodation by the banking system. This residual profit of 
enterprise also becomes the fulcrum of capitalist crises, as it generally defines bankruptcy, bank 
losses and the resulting monetary instability.
The paper characterises the risks posed by credit relations in relation to aggregate flows of profit of 
enterprise, considering them along exponential steady states, and across step-change perturbations 
to  parameter  values.  It  shows  that  aggregate  increases  in  indebtedness  do  not  in  themselves   
increase financial fragility. In fact, sustained paces of net credit extension, and of own investment, 
are  shown to boost profit of enterprise,  and to  strengthen the  aggregate  financial  robustness of 
capitalist enterprises. 
Interruptions  to  the  pace  of  net  credit  extension  are  shown  to  be  sufficient  to  disrupt  the 
profitability of capitalist enterprises, and to increase the likelihood of credit and corollary monetary 
crises. The framework offered by the paper also allows consideration of the interaction between 
credit disruptions and broader disruptions to mark-up rates, rates of interest, and the pace of own investment. As such, it allows a structural examination of the credit moments of crisis processes 
emphasised respectively by Marxian, Post-Keynesian and Keynesian contributions. 
In  line  with  this  purpose,  the  paper  advances  a  distinctive  measure  of  aggregate  financial 
vulnerability based  on  the  fact  that for  any given  disruption  to accumulation,  there  will  be  a 
minimum  ex post pace  of net credit extension that ensures positive aggregate flows of profit of 
enterprise.  This  minimum  pace  offers a  useful  measure  of  aggregate  financial  vulnerability,  as 
during  any disruption it will be generally difficult to sustain higher levels of net credit extension. 
On this basis, the paper formally demonstrates that while economies with high paces of borrowing 
and own investment are more profitable and robust while lending is sustained, they are more prone 
to  credit  crises when  faced  with  any given  perturbation  involving  a  fall  in  the  pace  of  own 
investment. 
The real structural contradiction of credit relations lies in that their very ability to boost profitability 
and  the  pace  of  accumulation,  and  to  improve  aggregate  financial  robustness,  simultaneously 
encourages greater paces of net credit extension and renders the economy more vulnerable to any 
given negative disruption. The capitalist process is recurrently and endogenously driven to credit 
crises and attendant monetary disruptions.  
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the structural macroeconomic framework on 
which the paper’s model is founded, including explicit consideration of the monetary foundations, 
requirements and contradictions of capitalist credit relations. Section 3 considers steady-state results 
concerning the impact of credit on growth, profitability and aggregate financial robustness. Section 
4  considers  a  general  step perturbation to steady-state  paths.  Section  5  concludes with  a  brief 
discussion of the implication of these findings for analysis of the credit moments of the capitalist 
business cycle. 
2. The Continuous-Time Model of the Circuit of Capital
Marxian political economy conceptualises capitalist social reproduction at the aggregate level on 
the basis of the circuit of capital, a schematisation of the moments and forms taken by capital value 
as it seeks self-expansion. For a single pulse of value this process takes the form, 
M − C(lp,mp)− P − C'− M ' > M   (2.1)Capitalists advance value in monetary form  M as investment in input commodities labour power   
and means of production (lp and mp respectively). These are deployed and used in the process of 
production P which  yields output commodities C' that are  subsequently sold for  a  quantity of 
money M '.  The entire process is driven by the expectation that, on the sale of output, M ' > M,
which hinges on the creation of surplus value from the employment of labour power in production 
and  its realisation  in the  form  of monetary profits in  commodity exchange.  Positive  monetary 
profits allow the recommitment of value to the circuit in growing scales, and are the fundamental 
bases for positive rates of accumulation. 
Process (2.1) is fundamentally dynamic. Aggregate social capital is composed of myriad pulses of 
value transversing  the circuit, so that at any given time a certain measure of value is engaged in 
each stage  of the  process. In the  model presented here, the  demand and supply flows ensuring 
commodity sales at any point in time are located in relation to process (2.1). Further, each phase of 
the  process in understood to pose  time lags, which delay the flow of value through investment, 
production and sale. Those lags collectively define the turnover time of capital, an average measure 
of the time necessary for a quantum of value to complete a cycle, which is an obvious determinant 
of the dynamic profitability of capital. 
This section offers a formalisation of this process based on Foley (1982, 1986), including explicit 
consideration of the monetary and balance-sheet foundations of credit extension. While primarily 
laying the basis for the paper’s findings, the section also establishes as theorems structural results 
concerning credit, growth and the evolution of capitalist net worth. 
2.1 Flows of Value in Capitalist Reproduction: Production and Sale
At the centre of the formalisation offered by Foley (1982, 1986) are lag functions describing the 
flow of value through each of the phases in process (2.1), and through circuits of revenue. At any 
time t,  the lag  function xi(t −τ;t)  describes the proportion of value that entered phase i of the 
circuit at time τ ≤ t currently exiting that phase. In this formulation it is possible to describe the 
evolution of the lag process over time. The preservation of value only requires that,  xi(t −τ;t)dt =1,
τ
∞
∫   (2.1)
ensuring  all value  entering  all phases of the circuit eventually exits. This formalisation allows a 
dynamic depiction of process (2.1) for aggregate social capital. 
Let C(t) denote the aggregate flow of investment, with a fraction κ(t)C(t) invested in labour-power 
and (1−κ(t))C(t) invested  in  means  of  production.  Once  the  decision  to  invest  value  into 
production is taken, its transformation into outputs over time may be represented mathematically by 
a lag process function, xp(t'). In this case the flow of output commodities P(t) may be expressed as
P(t) = C(τ)xp(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫   (2.2)
Once commodity output is produced, the monetary realisation of profits through sales is also subject 
to a lag. This realisation lag is considered to be an endogenous function of the relative paces of 
commodity supplies and aggregate demand DA(t). Supposing for simplicity it takes the form of a 
simple time delay Tr(t) at any point in time,4 and assuming commodities follow a simple first-in-






So that enhanced demand flows in relation to output flows will tend to shorten the realisation delay 
period Tr(t), and relatively slack demand lengthen it. 
4 Formally xr(t) = δ(Tr), the Dirac delta function, taking the value of zero for all t ≠ Tr, and infinity for t = Tr.
5 By the Mean Value Theorem, Foley (1986). Commodity sales generate total revenues S(t), giving surplus value its embodiment as a monetary 
mark-up q(t)over production costs. In line with conventional Marxian analysis, the view taken here 
is that q(t) = ε(t)κ(t) , the product of the share of labour power in total productive capital κ(t), and 
ε(t), the rate of exploitation, both of which are determined prior to the sale of commodities. 










The  flow S'(t) defines sales that make simple, zero-growth reproduction possible, and is termed 
here  the  scale  of  simple  reproduction.  Suppose  that capitalists  are  in  a  position  to  make  full 
reinvestment of S'(t) and of a proportion p(t) of profits S''(t), so that value in the form of money 
amounting to S'(t)+ p(t)S''(t) is set aside for reinvestment, and (1− p(t))S''(t) is allocated to fund 
capitalist consumption. 
The  flow back  into investment of capitalist revenues set aside  for  investment is subject to an 
investment lag process, denoted here by xv(t').The relative severity of this lag describes the pace of 
investment, as well as the relative measure of capital value existing in monetary form. It thus also 
offers a measure of the liquidity of aggregate social capital.  
Money also flows through the circuits of revenue of workers and capitalists qua consumers. Those 
circuits commence  with  the  receipt,  respectively,  of  wage  payments κ(t)C(t) and  of  capitalist 
revenues allocated to funding of consumption,(1− p(t))S''(t).The expenditure of these revenues is also subject to lag processes, which represent dynamic generalisations of the respective marginal 
propensities to consume.6 Those processes are respectively denoted by xw(t') and xc(t').
The  movement of money, and thus its velocity, is fully characterised by the three lag  processes 
xv(t'), xw(t') and xc(t') describing its flow through the circuit of capital and the circuits of revenue. 
A unit of revenue entering any one of these processes at time τ will on average be spent after a 
lapse of time given by,
Ti(τ) = (t −τ)xi(t −τ;t)dt
τ
∞
∫   (2.6)
The reciprocal of this quantity, Ti(τ)
−1,  provides an ex post measure of the velocity of money across 
each lag process. Its average value across all three processes, weighted by the respective size of the 
corresponding money stocks, provides a similar ex post measure of money velocity in the economy. 
2.2 Flows of Value in Capitalist Reproduction: Investment, Demand and Realisation
Capitalist investment and aggregate demand may now be characterised. Total investment will be 
given by the own funds emerging from this lag process plus net credit extension to capitalists,  
 B(t),  
 
C(t) = S'(τ)+ p(τ)S''(τ) [ ]xv(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫ +  B(t)  (2.6)
Investment draws on past unspent capitalist revenues and net credit extension. It also constitutes the 
most general conditioner of demand. It immediately funds purchases of means of production. It also 
funds wage payments and capitalist profits that will in turn appear as commodity demand. Demand 
for consumption goods by workers and capitalists will be given by,
Dw(t) = κ(τ)C(τ)xw(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫   (2.8)
6 Foley (1986).Dc(t) = (1− p(τ))S''(τ)xc(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫   (2.9)
Aggregate demand, or total value seeking commodities will thus be,
S(t) = D(t) = (1−κ(t))C(t)+ Dw(t)+ Dc(t)  (2.10)
From  (2.8)  and  (2.9)  it is  clear  that  without net  extension  of  consumption  loans,  demand  for 
consumer  goods  will  only  be  sustainable  if  it  does  not  exceed  current  income  flows,  or   
Dw(t) ≤κ(τ)C(τ), and Dc(t) ≤ (1− p(τ))S''(τ). In that case, is is evident from (2.10) that,
S(t) ≤ C(t)+ (1− p(t))S''(t)  (2.11)
Assuming  for  simplicity  that  the  mark-up  and  capitalisation  rates  are  constant  over  time,   
manipulation of (2.10) and the explicit expression of investment flows yields,
 






 B(t)   (2.12)
Inequality (2.11) points to the constraints bearing upon the accumulation of capital in the sphere of 
circulation, which relate to its endogenous ability to generate demand flows capable of realising 
value mark-ups as monetary profits.
 
Theorem  2.1:  If  the  investment  lag  process xv(t') is  constant  over  time  and  non-trivial  (ie, 
investment is not instantaneous) growth in the scale of simple reproduction S'(t) requires positive 
flows of net credit extension  
 B(t).




∫ =1  (2.13)In this case the term under the integral in (2.12) is a weighted average of past values of S'(t). But 
growth in S'(t) by definition requires S'(t) > S'(τ),∀τ < t.This will only be possible if  
 B(t) > 0.   
It is of course also possible for the present scale of simple reproduction to exceed all of its past 
values if the investment lag process becomes less severe. In this case, growth and profits arise from 
an increase in the pace of investment, which also amounts to an increase in the pace of dishoarding, 
the level of illiquidity borne by social capital, and to an increase in the average velocity of money. 
While these processes may lead to temporary spurts of growth, they are not sustainable basis for 
accumulation as  capitalist money hoards cannot become  arbitrarily small,  social  capital  cannot 
become  arbitrarily  illiquid,  and  the  velocity  of  money  cannot  rise  indefinitely.  Expanding 
investment plans will systematically include a demand for credit, which in contemporary monetary 
systems is accommodated in the first instance through the ex nihilo issuance of new bank liabilities 
enjoying at least some acceptance as a form of money.7
2.3 Stocks of Value in Capitalist Accumulation
The  lag  processes  in  the  economy give  rise  to  five  stocks  of  idle  value:  unfinished  output, 
inventories, and money hoards in the circuit of capital; and the saved personal income of workers 
and capitalists. The evolution of these stocks is defined by the flows above. In the circuit of capital, 
stocks of unfinished commodities, inventories and money dynamically obey, respectively,
 
 Π(t) = C(t)− P(t)  (2.14)
 
 Ν(t) = P(t)− S'(t)    (2.15)
 
 ΜK(t) = S'(t)+ pS''(t)− C(t)−  B(t) ( )  (2.16)
Stocks of unfinished output evolve as invested value C(t) becomes input commodities and as value 
P(t) emerges as finished output. Inventories are fed by new output and depleted by sales (net of 
mark-ups). Money hoards in the circuit are formed as capitalists set aside their own unconsumed 
revenues for future investment and sink their own capital into investment, given by total investment 
C(t)net of new borrowing, which draws on newly created (and thus not previously held) money. 
7 See dos Santos (2011b). The  lags  in  the  expenditure  of  personal  revenues  also  give  rise  to  money  holdings,  given 
respectively for workers and capitalists qua consumers,
 
 Μw(t) =κ(t)C(t)− Dw(t)   (2.17)
 
 Μc(t) = (1− p)S''(t)− Dc(t)   (2.18)
The total stock of money in the economy, M(t) ≡ MK(t)+ Mc(t)+ Mw(t), will evolve in line with 
(2.16)-(2.16), which by (2.10) will follow,
 
 Μ(t) =  B(t)  (2.19)
It is now possible to provide a dynamic characterisation of investment, savings and the sources of 
profit realisation. Adding (2.18) and (2.19) and substitution into (2.10) yield, 
 C(t) = S'(t)+ pS''(t) [ ]+  Μc(t)+  Μc(t)  (2.20)
Present investment is understood here to fund present savings by capitalist producers, consumers, 
and by workers. At the same time, the dynamic formulation in (2.7) ensures that present investment 
is in turn funded from past savings by capitalist producers, and present net borrowing, itself shown 
below to be conditioned by existing holdings of previously unspent money. Equation (2.20) may be 
manipulated to yield an explicit expression for the sources of realisation of profits,
 
pS''(t) = S'(τ)+ pS''(τ) [ ]xv(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫ +  B(t)− S'(t)−  Μc(t)−  Μc(t)   (2.21)
Present capitalised profits arise as a  result of capitalist own investment, which itself draws from 
past revenues  including  profits,  plus  net  borrowing,  minus  recovered  past  capital  outlays and 
savings by workers and capitalist consumers. Clearly the scale of net borrowing will help drive the 
realisation of profits whose capitalisation helps drive the accumulation of capital.In the present framework total social capital made up of all value engaged by capitalist producers, 
that  is, K(t) ≡ Π(t)+ Ν(t)+ ΜK(t). Its  evolution  is  driven  by  investment,  which  is  funded  by 
capitalised profits and net borrowing, and motivates Theorem 2.2.
 
 K(t) ≡ pS''(t)+  B(t)  (2.22)
Theorem 2.2: As long as a fraction of profits is capitalised, net credit extension makes a greater 
contribution to total social capital value than it does to total stocks of debt. 
Proof: By (2.21) and (2.20) it is evident that  
 K(t) is proportional to  (1+ p)  B(t).    
Theorem 2.2 and  equation (2.19) highlight the  analytical advantages of the  dynamic framework 
developed  here in relation  to traditional  Circuitist approaches to credit and accumulation.  First, 
dynamic consideration of net credit extension makes possible monetary profits, the pursuit of which 
is  the  fundamental  imperative  of  capitalist  relations.  Second,  positive  profits  and  their  partial 
recommitment to investment gives rise to positive net worth for capitalist producers, which arises as 
the result of the expansion of own investment through the capitalisation of profits, and of the pace 
of net credit extension. On these bases it is possible to characterise the level of leverage or gearing 
taken on by aggregate social capital, and allows explicit consideration of the consequences, risks 
and contradictions posed by capitalist credit relations. 
In order to pursue analysis of these, it is necessary first to inquire into the relationship between 
credit extension and the stocks of money arising in the accumulation of capital.
2.4 Money Hoards and Credit Relations
Money hoards in the circuit of capital and circuits of revenue fundamentally condition the pace of 
net credit extension in capitalist accumulation. They support credit relations by providing dynamic 
scopes for the circulation of bank liabilities issued ex nihilo, so long  as the latter are accepted as 
embodiments of capital value.8 Their magnitude and distribution relative to current production and 
consumption  plans  conditions the  net demand  for  credit. The willingness  of money holders to 
8 As argued in dos Santos (2011a, 2011b). maintain a fraction of their holdings in the form of bank liabilities conditions the ability of the credit 
system to accommodate any given level of net credit demanded.
Credit relations give rise to a hierarchy of money forms in the capitalist economy. As argued by 
Lapavitsas (2003),  in  the  resulting  monetary  structure  different  forms  of  credit  money posses 
different market and institutional foundations for their circulation. The circulation of bank liabilities 
is supported by assets in  bank portfolios and  reserve  holdings of more social forms of money. 
Through  the  development of  the  interbank  market bank  assets  come  to  include  claims  on  all 
borrowers, and banks become able to draw on the banking system’s collective reserves. The main 
domestic reserve money are liabilities of the Central Monetary Authority (CMA). Their circulation 
is established as the money of settlement of the interbank market, and is later boosted by being 
deemed legal tender by the state. 
The domestic legal-tender status of CMA liabilities does not have any purchase outside the national 
economy. Their circulation among  capitalists in a  position  to withdraw value  from the  national 
economy has to be supported on market bases, which require the sound functioning of the interbank 
market, and CMA reserve holdings of a world money that settles international obligations. Although 
this need is most clearly felt at times of crisis, the CMA can ill afford to neglect rate at which its 
liabilities  exchange  for  world  money,  which  conditions  domestic  profitability  the  smooth 
functioning of the interbank market. 
Considering for simplicity a closed economy, this structure may be represented formally. Suppose 
money holders are willing to hold a fraction d(t) of their total holdings M(t) in the form of bank 
liabilities D(t), with the balance held as CMA liabilities H
C(t).  Banks hold CMA reserves H
R(t),





   (2.23)
Aggregate illiquidity is set by the balance-sheet choices of money holders and banks, 




  (2.24)Total  money in  circulation, understood to  be the result of  endogenous money creation may be 





This relationship evolves dynamically in line with,
 
 M(t) =  B(t) =
1
1− y(t)
 H(t)+  y(t)M(t) { }   (2.26)
Credit extension throws new money into circulation. New bank liabilities instantaneously appear in 
the hands of workers hired by the borrower, and capitalists selling  inputs to the borrower. These 
holders will adjust their money portfolios in line with d(t). Bank lending not only creates holdings 
of bank liabilities, but also creates demand on banks for CMA reserves. 
In line with an endogenous understanding of money creation, equation (2.26) is taken to describe 
the  various manners in which  the  banking  system  may accommodate  any given  level  of credit 
demand  
 B(t). The balance  of  methods used will  hinge bank attempts to maximise profits. Bank 
profits will be conditioned by the costs of ensuring levels of bank liability circulation d(t), and the 
costs  and terms  on  which  CMA money may be  obtained.  Their ability to accommodate  credit 
demand is thus constrained by the general perceptions of the quality of bank assets, capital levels, 
and holdings of CMA reserves, and the costs and terms at which the CMA makes its own liabilities 
available. The latter depend on policy goals, which in settings of convertibility are constrained by 
the need to ensure the circulation of CMA liabilities.
3. The Contributions, Limits and Contradictions of Credit Relations in Accumulation
The  general  dynamic  structure  of  accumulation,  credit and  portfolio  behaviour  outlined  above 
above may be used to describe a wealth of dynamic macroeconomic interactions and behaviour. For 
instance, its explicit treatment of money hoards in accumulation and the balance-sheet requirements 
of any given pace of net credit extension leads to a distinctive appreciation of Steindl’s (1952) 
“paradox  of  debt”.  Equation  (2.21)  may  be  manipulated  to  yield  an  expression  relating  own 
investment and net borrowing to savings by capitalist enterprises, workers and capitalist consumers, 
1+ p(t)q(t) [ ]S'(t)+  Μc(t)+  Μw(t) = 1+ p(τ)q(τ) [ ]S'(τ)xv(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫ +  B(t)   (3.1)
Investment levels on the right-hand side fund “savings”, consisting of additions to money hoards 
held  respectively  by  enterprises,  capitalist  consumers  and  workers.  These  savings  condition 
borrowing, but only indirectly, as total money hoards (including those held by enterprises) support 
given paces of net credit extension as described by the balance-sheet identity in (2.26). 
Suppose  capitalists  facing  bad  prospects wish  to  reduce  their  pace  of  own  investment and  net 
borrowing in proportions that target a new, lower level of leverage. If the resulting fall in aggregate 
investment  is  met  with  an  inelastic  response  in  flows  of  savings  by  workers  and  capitalist 
consumers, (3.1) ensures capitalist revenues and retained earnings will fall disproportionately. This 
will  dynamically  frustrate  original  individual  plans  to  lower  levels  of  leverage,  as  capitalist 
revenues and retained earnings flows are reduced. The only way to reach the original target leverage 
involves lowering levels of liquidity, with enterprises increasing the pace at which retained earnings 
are recommitted to investment, which also runs counter to original plans. 
At the same time, if demand for bank liabilities and the degree of CMA accommodation of bank 
demand for reserves remain unchanged, banks will experience increases in their levels of liquidity 
as inelastic savings fall less severely than credit demand. In this case interest rates may fall, which 
may help stabilise the situation as the pace of savings from personal revenues falls and as capitalist 
borrowing  plans are revised. Alternatively, if demand for bank liabilities is also falling, or if the 
CMA’s ability to accommodate net lending is compromised, as may be the case in a general crisis, 
vicious cycles of frustrated attempts to reduce leverage fuelling further decreases in investment and 
leverage may follow. 
A wealth of thought experiments along these lines are possible. In order to derive tractable results 
concerning  the  most general  features of  the  relationship between  credit relations  and capitalist 
accumulation, this section considers simple dynamic evolutions in which the model’s parameters 
are  held  constant. The  resulting  exponential  steady state  paths  afford  general  insights  into  the 
impact of sustained net credit extension on rates of growth and different aggregate measures of 
profitability. They also  cast light into  the  inherent limits  and  contradictions of  capitalist credit relations, which are pursued further in the next section through quasi-dynamic consideration of a 
discrete step changes to the economy’s parameters. 
3.1 Credit, Its General Impact on Growth and Its Limits
Abstracting from lags in consumption expenditures, the economy’s structure is fully described by 
the system of integral and differential equations given by (2.2) - (2.7), (2.14) - (2.16), (2.22), and 
the definition of total capital in circulation.9 
The resulting system contains an autonomous sub-system describing the economy’s evolution in the 
sphere  of  circulation,  where  accumulation  is constrained by its endogenous  ability to  generate 
demand flows allowing the dynamic realisation of profits. This sub-system may be identified from 
the  definition  of  investment  flows  in  (2.6)  and  the  definition  of  sales  flows  given  by  (2.10) 
considered for  instantaneous consumption expenditures.  Normalising  the  pace  of lending  to the 
scale of simple reproduction, so that  
 B(t) = h(t)S'(t), those two equations yield,
(1+ p(t)q(t))S'(t) = (1+ p(τ)q(τ))S'(τ)xv(t −τ;t)dτ
−∞
t
∫ + h(t)S'(t)   (3.2)
Any given paths for h(t), p(t), q(t)  and xv(t −τ;t)  fully specify a path for S'(t) as defined by (3.2). 
Put differently, the pace of own investment, the pace of credit and money creation, and the paths for 
the mark-up and capitalisation rates fully specify the structural evolution of this economy, when it is 
considered  exclusively from  the  sphere  of  commodity circulation.  So  long  as  inventories  are 
positive, productive constraints do not bind, and the specification of S'(t)in (3.2) fully describes the 
economy’s evolution, which can be recovered from the system’s remaining equations.
While  the  dynamic  interactions  between  the  pace  of  own  investment  and  net  borrowing  are 
potentially  complex  and  manifold,  in  seeking  to  characterise  the  broad  structural  relationship 
9 The system, recapped in Appendix A, is well-specified, has ten equations and ten endogenous unknown functions (five 
flows, four stocks, and one endogenous realisation time delay). The solutions for all ten unknowns are determined by 
three  parameter  paths h(t), p(t), and q(t), and  the  evolution  of  the  investment  and  production  lag  processes, 
xv(t −τ;t) and xp(t −τ;t).between credit and accumulation it is useful to consider the most general, abstract case in which all 
parameters and lag processes are constant. In such a case, equation (3.1) simplifies to,
S'(t) =
1+ pq




∫   (3.3)
This is a Fredholm integral equation of the first kind with a difference Kernel, whose exponential 
solution is well known.10 The resulting solutions for all stocks and flows in the economy are  given 
in  Appendix  A,  and are  characterised  by the  Laplace  Transforms of  the  lag  processes for  the 
system’s complex-valued rate of growth g,  
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∫ ,   (3.4)
An endogenous characterisation of the system’s rate of growth can be obtained from the solution of 






1+ pq − h
  (3.5)
This equation describes the determination in the sphere of exchange of the the system’s steady-state 
rate of growth g = g(h, p,q;xv(t')). It is trivial to establish form (3.4) and (3.5) that when the pace of 
net credit extension  is zero,  so  will the economy’s rate  of accumulation. The broader shape  of 
g = g(h, p,q;xv(t')) is established in the next three results. 
Theorem 3.1: The economy’s endogenous rate of accumulation g = g(h, p,q;xv(t')) as specified in 
(3.5) is a monotonically increasing, convex function on  the pace of net credit extension, h. 
10 See Polyanin and Manzhirov (2008), p 115. Proof: The derivative of both sides of (3.5) with respect to h may be identified using the chain rule 
and the fact that the derivative with respect to g of the Laplace Transform of a function  f(t) will be 




(1+ pq)L txv(t),g { }
  (3.6)
Since  L txv(t),g { } > 0,  for the lag process functions considered here, this derivative is positive. 





(1+ pq)L txv(t),g { }
2 ≥ 0     
Seen exclusively from the sphere  of circulation, steady states with higher sustained paces of net 
credit extension will experience higher sales flows and thue quicker paces of accumulation. The 
convexity  on h of g(h, p,q;xv(t')) follows  from  the  fact  that  by helping  expand  the  scale  of 
reproduction, net lending contributes to the expansion of credit demand and its accommodation.  
Equation  (3.5)  also  affords  characterisations  of  the  relationship  between  the  pace  of  own 
investment, net credit extension and the rate of accumulation rate of accumulation.
Proposition 3.2: Steady states with quicker paces of own investment, measured by the present value 
of the  investment lag function xv(t') discounted by any positive rate, will exhibit  higher rates of 
growth for any given set of parameters p,  q, and h.





∫ , so that by the very definition of the pace of investment, an 
investment lag  process 
1xv(t) will  correspond to a  quicker pace of  investment than  another lag process 




*(g) for any real g.  Consequently, for any p, q, and h, the 
first lag process will satisfy equation (3.5) with g1 > g2, which satisfies it for the second.        
Explicit consideration of exponential-decay and discrete-delay specifications for the investment lag 
process allows a more precise demonstration of the result expressed in Proposition 3.2. Under those 
specifications the lag processes take the respective forms xv(t) = ve
−vt, and xv(t) = δ(v
−1), where v
thus provides a positive measure of the pace of investment in each setting. The Laplace Transforms 
of the processes are  xv
*(g) = e




. This leads to the following result, 
Theorem  3.3:  Under exponential and discrete-delay  lag processes, the endogenous steady-state 
rate of accumulation is rising on the respective positive measures of the pace of own investment.
Proof: The expressions for the Laplace Transforms of the investment lag  processes and Equation 
(3.5) allow explicit expressions for the economy’s endogenous rate of accumulation. In the case of 
exponential decays it is given by,
g(h, p,q,v) =
hv
(1+ pq − h)
  (3.7)
For discrete delays, 
 g(h, p,q,v) = vln
1+ pq








And it is trivially obvious that in both specifications 
∂
∂v
g(h, p,q,v) > 0.    
It is also evident that higher paces of own investment enhance the impact of net credit extension on 
the rate of accumulation. 
Corollary 3.4: Under exponential decay and discrete-delay lag processes, the impact of the pace of 
net credit extension on the endogenous steady-state rate of accumulation is rising on the respective 














(1+ pq − h)
> 0     
Higher paces of sustained net credit extension and of own investment will individually and jointly 
yield steady states with quicker paces of accumulation. But their ability to boost demand, profit 
flows and rates of growth faces important constraints in production. In line with Foley (1982), those 
may be understood by considering the endogenous evolution of the realisation lag in (2.3). Along 





=1+ pq   (3.9)
As demand starts to exhaust inventories, Tr approaches zero, and demand-pull inflationary pressures 
build up. At such levels of demand, additional increases in the pace of credit extension or in the 
pace of own investment no longer ensure higher paces of real accumulation, but bid up money 
prices instead. Increases in the pace net credit extension will only contribute  to higher paces of 




≤1+ pq   (3.10)
Inequality (3.10) defines a maximum rate of real growth gm, for which it holds with equality. Here 
this maximum rate of growth corresponds to a maximum sustained pace of net credit extension, hm,
for which gm = g(hm). The existence of a unique hm is ensured by the fact that when h = 0, g(h) = 0,and xp
*(0) =1, ensuring (3.10) holds strictly as long as pq > 0.  As h increases, the left hand side of 
(3.10) increases monotonically, while its right hand side stays constant. 
This maximum  pace  is conditioned by the  mark-up and capitalisation  rates,  the  production lag 
process, as well as by the investment lag  process, since g = g(h, p,q;xv(t')).  Put differently, hm is 
conditioned by the relationship between the velocity of money, which sets the pace at which money 
thrown to accumulation returns to markets as demand for commodities, the time productivity of 
labour, which sets the pace at which value thrown into investment returns to markets as supplies of 
commodities,  and  the  rate  of  profit  capitalisation,  which  measures  the  pace  at  which  profits 
augment productive capacities through their reinvestment. 
It is possible to solve explicitly for hm for discrete-delay and exponential decay lag processes. As 
above let, in the first case v  and  π  denote the reciprocal of the investment and production time 


























≤1+ pq   (3.11)
Which may be solved to express the constraint on hm,
hm = (1+ pq)− (1+ pq)
1−
π
v   (3.12)
It is trivial to establish that this maximum pace of steady-state net credit extension is rising on both 
pq and on π v, as intuitively motivated above. 
The  same  reasoning  can  be  followed  for  exponential  decays,  where v and π will  denote  the 
respective  rates of  decay describing  the  dynamic  evolution of  own investment and  commodity 
output production. From (3.7) and (3.10) it follows that,hm =
(1+ pq)π pq
π pq + v
  (3.13)
Which ensure that hm  is also rising both on the rate of profit capitalisation and the time-productivity 
of labour relative to the pace of investment, measured here by π υ.
3.2 Credit, Profitability and Profit of Enterprise  
The  model’s  steady-state  solutions  also  afford  general  insights  into  the  structural  relationship 
between net lending, own investment, aggregate demand and capitalist revenues. Credit relations 
can be shown directly to condition aggregate profitability on total capital in circulation, as well as 
the relative weight of the aggregate debt burden. As such they condition aggregate flows of profit of 
enterprise, that is gross profits net of interest payments, and aggregate measures of credit risk. 
These relationships have important implications for investment and funding behaviour, the business 
cycle and the crises. 
Consider first the effect of the pace of net credit extension on the steady-state rate of profit on total 









Theorem  3.4:  Exponential  steady-states with higher paces of  net  credit  extension  will, ceteris 
paribus, enjoy higher rates of profit on aggregate social capital.






2 g'(h)(pq + h)− g(h) { }  (3.15)
By Theorem 3.1, g'(h)pq > 0, ∀pq > 0.  Also, g(h) is convex, which since g(0) = 0 ensures that the 
other terms inside the brackets in (3.18) obey g'(h)h − g(h) > 0, all of which establishes that,d
dh
ρs(h) > 0     
Two important points follow from (3.14). First, as shown by Proposition 3.2 and Theorem  3.3, 
higher paces of own investment will lead to higher rates of accumulation for any given levels of h,
p, and q. By (3.14) they are shown also to lead to higher rates of aggregate profit. Both quicker 
paces of own investment and quicker paces of net lending are in themselves sufficient to heighten 
the dynamic profitability of social capital. 
Second, following Foley (1982), it is possible to use (3.14) to characterise the relationship between 
profitability and the economy’s rate of growth, which in this framework is explicitly mediated by 
the pace of net credit extension. This yields a modified version of the Cambridge Equation,










Sustained net credit extension thus contributes to growth through two distinct channels. It supports 
the realisation of profits on existing capital value, some of which are capitalised and recommitted to 
investment, and it directly finances new investment undertakings. At the broadest level it is on the 
basis of these potential effects on aggregate profitability and growth that banking  capital stakes a 
claim on a share of aggregate capitalist profits. 
Yet it is that very claim that ensures credit relations also contribute to the possibility of credit and 
monetary crises. In similar fashion to own investment, sustained net credit flows boost demand, 
profits and accumulation. But they uniquely establish obligatory claims on future profits, which will 
be  divided between interest payments, and residual profit of  enterprise.11  This division creates 
11  In  the  monetary structure  considered in section 2.4  interest payments on loans fund interest payments on bank 
liabilities, interest payments by banks on borrowings of CMA liabilities, and bank profits. As neither bank capital nor 
the  fiscal operations of  the  capitalist  state  are  considered here, bank  profits  and  the  distinctive  seigniorage  flows 
accruing to the CMA are not considered. Interest revenues on bank liabilities are treated as all other capitalist revenues, 
and are subject to the same allocation and delays.  opportunities for additional gains in the profitability of borrowing enterprises through leverage. But 
it also gives rise to potential instability and crises. 
To inquire into the relationship between credit relations, investment and aggregate credit risk it is 
thus necessary to consider flows of profit of enterprise, and the rate of return on own capital they 
represent.  The  rate  of  profit  of  enterprise  offers  a  more  concrete  measure  of  the  imperative 
governing capitalist investment than the rate of profit on total social capital. Profit of enterprise 
flows also offer an aggregate measure of credit risk. As those fall towards zero it is increasingly 
likely that large  number  of individual enterprises are  experiencing  negative  profits net of  debt 
service payments. 
In  such  situations,  distressed  enterprises  will  seek  to  meet debt  service  obligations  and  avoid 
bankruptcy by drawing on their existing money holdings, securing new credit, or liquidating capital 
value  in  commodity form.  Credit  relations  will  here  be  destructive  of  capital  value.  Interest 
payments  will  effect appropriations by the banking  system  of  capital  value  previously held  by 
enterprises.  Further,  if  sufficient  numbers  of  enterprises  are  unable  to  meet  debt  payments, 
significant  bank  asset  losses  follow.  As  claims  by  banks  on  capitalist  enterprises  sustain  the 
circulation of claims on banks as monetary embodiments of capital, such crises prove destructive of 
capital value in monetary form.12 
Formally, profit of enterprise is given by E(t) ≡ S''(t)− i(t)B(t).  Its rate is measured in relation to 






















ρs(h)− i { }   (3.19)
12 dos Santos (2011b). Equation (3.19)  identifies two distinct contributions sustained net credit extension makes to the 
aggregate  profitability  of  capitalist  enterprise.  First,  sustained  net  credit extension  boosts  the 
profitability of all capital in circulation, as demonstrated in Theorem 3.3. Second, it additionally 
presents the possibility of gains from leverage commensurate to, as shown by the second term of 
(3.21), the overall quantity of leverage multiplied by the gains (or losses) made possible by the 
different returns earned on capital in circulation and loans. Here credit relations effect distributions 
of profit flows that, so long  as the rate of interest is lower than the rate of return on circulating 
capital, benefit enterprises. 
The relationship between net credit extension and flows of profit of enterprise may be measured by 
considering the ratio of gross profits to debt service obligations for any given rate of interest, which 








Note first that for any given pace of net credit extension, this measure will be higher in economies 
with  quicker  paces of  own  investment,  by Proposition  3.2 and Theorem  3.3.  Similarly,  higher 
sustained paces of net credit extension will boost steady-state financial robustness,
 
Theorem  3.5:  Exponential  steady-states with higher paces of  net  credit  extension  will, ceteris 
paribus, enjoy higher levels of financial  robustness, as measured by profit flows relative to debt 
service flows. The same holds for steady-states with quicker paces of own investment.






2 g'(h)h − g(h) { }  (3.21)
Since g(0) = 0  and, by Theorem 3.1, g(h) is convex, this derivative is positive.      The discussion in this section yields two important structural findings on the role of credit relations 
in capitalist instability and crises. First and most generally, the dynamic profitability and financial 
robustness of  capitalist enterprises  have  determinations  in  the  sphere  of  production  and  in  the 
sphere of exchange. In the former they are conditioned by the composition of capital, and the rate of 
exploitation, and constrained by the time-productivity of labour. In the latter, they are conditioned 
by  the  overall  pace  of  investment,  including  own  and  leveraged  undertakings.13   This  result 
represents but a dynamic generalisation and application to profit of enterprise of the dependence of 
profits on investment, well understood since its explicit discovery by Michal Kalecki.14 
Notably, this structural result points to potentially destabilising  accelerator effects if investment, 
credit-demand  and  credit-accommodation  behaviour are  driven  by the  profitability of capitalist 
enterprises. If sufficient numbers of individual capitalists boost their pace of overall investment, 
increasing  their  relative  illiquidity  and  indebtedness,  aggregate  sales  flows,  profitability  and 
financial robustness will be boosted. Significantly, the same self-fulfilling logical may play out in 
the  opposite  direction.  Despite  these  potential  collective  gains,  the  individual  and  competitive 
character of appropriation ensures the levels of coordination necessary to sustain such paths elude 
capitalists as a class, particularly during times of downturn and distress. As Kalecki (1967) noted, 
“capitalists do many things as a class, but they certainly do not invest as a class”. 
Second, these findings have important implications for analysis of the distinctive contribution of 
credit to profitability and instability. Greater sustained paces of net credit extension  and higher 
aggregate levels of leverage are not in themselves capable of increasing the likelihood of crisis. In 
fact, as with own investment, they contribute  positively to  aggregate profitability and  financial 
robustness. But credit relations do make a distinctive contribution to instability in accumulation, by 
rendering  the economy more  vulnerable to any endogenous or exogenous disruption to mark-up 
rates, rates of interest, paces of own investment, or to the pace of net credit extension itself. The 
next section turns precisely to those issues. 
4. The Contribution of Credit Relations to Financial Vulnerability and Crises
Despite the collective gains sustained net credit extension generates for social capital, disruptions to 
credit  flows  arise  recurrently  in  competitive  capitalist  accumulation.  The  portfolio  behaviour   
13 They will also generally be conditioned by paces of consumption, assumed to be instantaneous here. 
14 See, for instance, Kalecki (1954).underpinning  credit  extension  is  governed  by  the  imperative  of  individual  appropriation. 
Expectations of impending financial problems, just or just speculative, are themselves sufficient to 
trigger individual actions resulting in falls in the pace of credit extension, which in turn create or 
exacerbate financial distress in enterprises and banks. In such a setting, competitive appropriation 
regularly ensures that it is individually sensible to abandon positions in the domestic  economy, 
reduce  holdings  of bank liabilities,  and  taper the  pace  of  net credit extension,  even when  the 
opposite  actions  could  collectively moderate  the  impact  or  wholly  avert  widespread  financial 
distress. Even more so than investing, capitalists do not hold liabilities as a class. 
Falling paths in the net pace of credit extension create problems not posed by other developments 
reducing demand flows, such as falls in the pace of own investment or consumption. Past lending 
bequeaths to the  future  payment obligations broadly proportional to itself,  so  that any demand 
disruptions raise the spectre of falls in aggregate profit of enterprise. In an economy with credit, 
profit of enterprise  is the  defining  measure  and fulcrum  of crises,  irrespective  of their original 
causes. Under negative or small positive levels of aggregate profit of enterprise it is very likely that 
many enterprises will be unable to make debt payments. In such situations, enterprises will seek to 
avoid bankruptcy by securing  and holding  on  to means of  payment, originating  in  their earlier 
money holdings, the liquidation of capital in commodity form, or in new credit.15 Particularly in a 
setting of falling net credit extension and aggregate demand, those measures will in many cases fail 
to  prevent bankruptcy. The  resulting  deterioration  of  bank  assets may erode  confidence  in  the 
robustness of  banks (and  of the national economy),  and  trigger monetary disruptions  that feed 
further contractions in credit.
This section analyses the  contributions of credit extension and broader disruptions to capitalist   
credit crises. It does so by inquiring into the impact of changes in the parameters of accumulation 
on  aggregate  profit  of  enterprise.  Instrumentally,  it  considers  step-change  perturbations  to 
exponential  steady-state  evolutions.16   On  these  bases it helps  identify the  credit  moments  of 
disruptions to accumulation traditionally emphasised  by existing  Marxian, Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian analyses. 
15 See de Brunhoff’s (1979) synthesis and development of Marx’s (1894) account of the credit moments of crises.
16 Along the lines of Foley (1986), § 15. The section also offers a new, aggregate measure of financial vulnerability: the minimum ex post 
pace of credit extension an economy needs to sustain in order ensure positive aggregate profit of 
enterprise  for  any  given  disruption.  On  this  basis  it  shows  that  while  economies  following 
exponential steady states with higher paces of credit extension are more robust while lending  is 
sustained, they are simultaneously more vulnerable to the possibility that any given disruption will 
trigger generalised bankruptcies, credit and monetary distress. 
4.1 The Contribution of Credit Relations to Crisis
Equations  (3.14)  and  (3.20)  show that falls  in  aggregate  profitability and  financial  robustness 
require either falls in the pace of own investment, falls in the  mark-up rate, or increases in the 
effective  rate  of  interest  facing  capitalist  enterprises.  The  contribution  of  each  of  these 
developments to crisis has been variously emphasised by heterodox analyses. Some Post- and New- 
Keynesian contributions have pointed to endogenous processes ensuring the rate of interest rises as 
the pace of lending picks up during the cyclical upswing.17 Classical Keynesian contributions have 
emphasised  the  impact of  low  paces  of  investment  (as  well  as  the  pace  of  consumption)  in 
extending crises. Traditional Marxian accounts of capitalist crises distinctively focus on the sphere 
of production, where  falling  mark-up rates may arise as a result of endogenous and competitive 
technical innovation that lower the relative weight of labour power in the composition of capital.
Contractions in the pace of credit extension will typically be an integral part of those disruptions. It 
is easy to see from the account offered above that those contractions will in themselves adversely 
affect aggregate profitability, profit of enterprise and financial robustness. Any fall in leveraged or 
own investment immediately reduces contemporaneous profit flows by the same amount.18 At the 
same  time,  only the  rate  of  change  of  stocks  of  total  capital  in  circulation  and  debt  change 
instantaneously. The social rate of profit, flows of profit of enterprise, and financial robustness as 
measured in (4.15), (4.18), and (4.20) respectively, will thus immediately deteriorate as a result. 
To examine the impact of disruptions of credit flows more formally, in a manner conducive to their 
integration into analyses of capitalist crises along  Keynesian, Post-Keynesian or Marxian lines, 
consider the following perturbation. Suppose an economy is characterised by a constant parameter 
17 Ultimately drawing on Kalecki’s (1937) original “principle of increasing risk”.




0(t'),h0,i0 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦, with h0, p0,q0 > 0, and  lag  processes  ensuring  positive 
inventories.  This  economy  will  follow  steady-state  paths  with  exponential  stocks  and  flows 
S0(t),S0 '(t),S0 ''(t),C0(t),P 0(t),B0(t),K0(t) { }.If unperturbed, at  t =θ  aggregate profit of enterprise 
will be given by,
E0(θ) = S0 ''(θ)− i0B0(θ)   (4.22)




1(t'),h1,i1 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦, under which it is assumed inventories are always positive. From this 
time onwards, own investment will be funded from retained earnings accrued before t =θ, which 
evolved exponentially, and those accrued after the step change. Own investment funds present sales 
and profits alongside new net borrowing h1S'(t).  Expressing this relationship in relation to gross 
profit flows G(t)  yields, 
G(t) =
q1































Interest obligations will be given by payments on debt acquired prior to the step change, which is 







∫   (4.24)
Profit of enterprise after the step change will thus be given by,
E(t) = G(t)−Y(t)   (4.25)
Equations (4.23) - (4.25) offer a full description of the non-exponential evolution of flows of profit 
of enterprise after the step change. Note that as the time since the step change increases the first terms in both (4.23) and (4.24) tend to vanish, and the evolution of profit of enterprise approximates 
a steady-state evolution defined by  

x1.
But it is the early evolution of profit of enterprise that is most germane to present purposes, as it 
will  determine  the  likelihood of  enterprise  distress and credit crisis immediately following  the 
perturbation. Consider its level at the exact time of the step change, t =θ. In that case the second 
terms in both G(t) and Y(t) vanish, yielding,
  E(θ) =
(1+ p0q0)







∫ ivB0(θ)  (4.26)
Expressing S0''(t') in its full exponential form, and expressing the integral in relation to t'' =θ −τ  
renders it equal to  S0''(θ)L xv
1,g(h0) { }.Using the exponential definition of B0(θ) and equation (4.5) 





(1+ p0q0 − h0)

















It is  now possible  to  consider the  impact of  the  step change  in the  economy’s parameters  on 
aggregate profit of enterprise, which will change in relation to that of an unperturbed economy as,
 
E(θ)− E0(θ) = S0''(θ)
q1
q0
(1+ p0q0 − h0)


















Equation (4.28) makes clear that all developments emphasised in Marxian, Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian  approaches  to  crises  can  contribute  in  this  setting  to  falls  in  aggregate  profit  of 
enterprise, consequently contributing to heightened financial instability. A fall in the mark-up rate,   
ensuring q1 < q0, is sufficient to make (4.28) negative, ceteris paribus. The same holds for falls in 
the pace of own investment, under which  L xv
1,g(h0) { } < L xv
0,g(h0) { }, and increases in the rate of 
interest applicable to previously acquired debt. The  equation  also  points  to  reductions  in  the  pace  of  credit  extension,  which  ensure 
(1+ p0q0 − h0) < (1+ p1q1 − h1), as an additional source of instability. It is possible to conclude that 
purely speculative concerns about prospects for enterprises or banks leading to falls in the pace of 
credit extension will be in themselves sufficient to lower aggregate profit of enterprise, adversely 
affecting  enterprises and banks. Reductions in the pace of lending  may also of course occur as an 
integral part of broader disruptions affecting the pace of own investment, mark-up or interest rates. 
In those crises, such reductions make their own contribution to falling profits of enterprise. 
4.2 A Measure of Aggregate Financial Vulnerability
This examination of the evolution  of aggregate  profit of  enterprise across a  step change  in the 
economy’s parameters leads to a distinctive measure of aggregate financial vulnerability. Any such 
perturbation defines a  minimum  new pace of  credit extension  below which  aggregate  profit of 
enterprise  will  be  negative.  This  minimum  value  is  a  useful  measure  of  aggregate  financial 
vulnerability as sustaining  levels  of  credit extension  is  generally difficult  under  general  crisis 
conditions. The higher the levels of lending required to keep aggregate profit of enterprise from 
approaching zero, the more vulnerable the economy is to the corresponding disruptions to mark up 
rates, interest rates, or to the pace of own investment.
This minimum pace h1
*  is determined by all other parameter values in  

x0 and  

x1. Significantly,  this 
includes the ex ante pace of credit extension h0.  On this basis it is possible to identify the level of 
financial  vulnerability faced  by  an  economy  evolving  along  exponential  steady  states  to  any 
arbitrary shock as a function of its present pace of credit extension. 
Formally, equation (4.27) can be simplified by using equation (4.5), yielding,
 
E(θ) = S'0(θ) q1
(1+ p0q0)












Aggregate profit of enterprise will be positive across a step parameter change only if the term inside 
the brackets is positive. The minimum level of the new pace of credit extension h1  that ensures this 
will be given by,  
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A number of significant results regarding the financial vulnerability of an economy to any given 
disruption follow.  Consider first the  relative  severity of  the  disruption.  Perturbations taking  the 
economy to states with a low mark-up rates   q1  relative to the applicable rate of interest iv will 
require higher ongoing paces of credit extension to remain stable.19 Perturbations involving stronger 
reductions in  the pace  of  own  investment, which yield lower values for  L xv
1,g(h0) { }, will also 
demand  higher  paces  of  credit extension  to  ensure  aggregate  solvency. As  expected,  stronger 
disruptions require greater reticence in credit extension to ensure financial stability. 
Equation (4.30) also allows characterisation of an economy’s financial vulnerability in relation to its 
ex ante pace of net credit extension. The impact on h1
* of h0 involves two effects. Mathematically, 
the  first effect involves  the  ratio between the  economy’s original  rate  of growth g(h0) and the 
original pace of credit extension h0.The second effect involves the impact of original levels of net 
credit extension on the Laplace Transform of the new lag process taken with respect to the original 
rate of growth,  L xv
1,g(h0) { }.
Economically,  the  first effect was  already evident under  Theorem  3.5. An  economy with high 
sustained  paces of  credit  extension  experiences  high  profit  flows  relative  to  all  stocks  in  the 
economy, including debt. As a result such an economy enjoys greater financial robustness ex ante, 
which  supports its robustness immediately following  the disturbance. This will  push h1
* towards 
lower values. But this is countered by the second effect, which arises from the dynamic relationship 
between  present and past sales flows. High  paces  of net lending  sustain high rates of  growth, 
particularly in economies with quick paces of own investment. Higher growth implies all past flows 
are  smaller  relative  to present flows than in slower-growing  economies. Past retained earnings, 
which  fund  present  own  investment,  will  thus  be  smaller  relative  to  the  present  scale  of 
19 Notably, in a situation of distress the higher credit extension requirement may itself lead to increases in the rate of 
interest, compounding the original problem. reproduction. The more leveraged an economy is, the more reliant it is on future credit flows to 
sustain sales and profits, and the more vulnerable it is to any disruptions to aggregate demand. 
It is possible to characterise the net result of both effects for perturbations involving falls in the pace 
of own investment when lag processes take the form of exponential decays and discrete delays. This 
establishes that the second effect dominates the first one across perturbations involving falls in the 
pace of own investment. 
Theorem 4.1: Under exponential-decay and discrete-delay lag processes, economies evolving with 
higher  steady-state  paces  of  credit  extension  are  more  vulnerable  to  perturbations  involving 
reductions in the  pace  of own investment, as they  will require  higher minimum paces of credit 
extension after such perturbations to maintain positive aggregate profit of enterprise. 
Proof: Under exponential decays equation (4.30) becomes, 
h1
* = 1+ p1q1 ( )− 1+ p0q0 ( )
q1
iv
v0 1+ p0q0 − h0 1− v0 v1 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
−1
  (4.31)





* = 1+ p0q0 ( )
q1
iv
1+ p0q0 − h0 1− v0 v1 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
−2
v0 v0 v1 −1 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦   (4.32)
Which will be positive whenever v1 < v0, as will be the case for any perturbation that lowers the 
pace of own investment. As shown in Appendix B, the same line of reasoning may be followed for 




* ≥ 0 for the same type of perturbation.    
Economies evolving along  exponential steady states with high paces of credit extension are more 
financially robust while lending is sustained. They are simultaneously more vulnerable to negative 
disruptions to accumulation, under which they need to maintain higher levels of credit extension to 
avoid generalised credit crises. Significantly, this vulnerability does not follow from movements in 
the  interest rate  or the  mark-up rate.  It follows from  the  sheer structural  dependence  of highly 
leveraged systems on ongoing high paces of credit extension to sustain sales and profit flows. 5. Conclusions  
The  paper  offered  a  dynamic,  structural  characterisation  of  the  contributions,  limits  and 
contradictions of credit relations in the  accumulation of capital. The resulting  framework makes 
distinctive contributions to existing heterodox work that has offered deliberate analyses of money 
and credit in the process of accumulation.
In  relation  to  Circuitist  approaches,20   the  framework  advanced  by the  paper  can  account  for 
capitalist monetary profits. The capitalisation of those profits lays the basis for positive net worth 
and,  consequently,  aggregate  levels  of  leverage  arising  from  borrowing  and  own  investment 
decisions. As such the framework allows analysis of the risks posed by credit as inherent features of 
credit relations. Explicit and dynamic consideration of the process of production and supply also 
allows characterisations of the limits of the ability of net credit extension to boost real  growth. 
Finally, the  framework is based on explicit consideration of the monetary limits and constraints 
bearing on the ex nihilo issuance of bank liabilities. 
In relation to traditional Marxian approaches, the framework locates credit relations in relation to 
stocks and flows of money in the circuit of capital. It offers explicit consideration of the creation 
and circulation of credit money advanced ex nihilo in the process of accumulation. It also enables 
analysis of credit relations as one of the key determinants of dynamic profitability, instability and 
crisis within  the  sphere  of  circulation.  Most broadly,  the  discussion  outlined  a  framework  for 
integrated analyses of the credit moments of crises originating in overproduction, as well as those 
involving endogenously rising interest rates, or falling paces of own investment. 
On the basis of the comparative-static properties of exponential steady states and consideration of 
simple step-change perturbations to such states, a  number  of structural  results were established. 
Sustained net credit extension boosts growth, aggregate  profitability and the aggregate  financial 
robustness  of  capitalist enterprises.  These  benefits  are  constrained  by the  economy’s dynamic 
productive capacities, and tempered by the risks of credit crises posed by potential disruptions to 
accumulation. Paradoxically, economies with high paces of borrowing and own investment, while 
more profitable and robust as long as the pace of lending  is sustained, are more prone to credit 
crises when faced with any given perturbation involving a fall in the pace of own investment. Credit 
20 See Lavoie (1992) and Graziani (2003) for the canonical expositions of French and Italian circuitism, respectively.  relations are fundamentally contradictory in that their very ability to boost accumulation and present 
financial robustness inherently renders the economy more financially vulnerable.
These  structural findings have important implications for analysis of  the credit moments of the 
business cycle. The impact of paces of own and leveraged investment on the aggregate profitability 
of social capital and of capitalist enterprises points to destabilising accelerator effects. Individual 
expectations about profitability may drive  investment,  credit-demand and  credit-accommodation 
decisions  that  are  sufficient  in  themselves  to  boost  aggregate  profitability  and  the  financial 
robustness of enterprises. On the upswing this ensures market signals thus drive the boom along, 
while simultaneously rendering the economy more vulnerable to any given disruption that tapers the 
pace of own investment. 
Endogenous  tendencies  for  falling  mark-up  rates  or  rising  rates  of  interest  will  ensure  such 
disruptions are recurrent, as will purely speculative falls in credit demand, its accommodation, or in 
holdings of bank liabilities. Once aggregate profit of enterprise is disrupted, the same self-fulfilling 
logic generates self-reinforcing falls in the profits of capitalist enterprises. But while the sky may 
have seemed the limit for profitability and robustness during the upswing, bankruptcy enforces a 
hard floor against which accumulation soon crashes. Credit relations come to destroy capital values 
through payment obligations that exceed gross profit flows, and through monetary disruptions that 
destroy capital in the form of claims on banks. 
So long as investment and borrowing are guided by enterprise profits, swings along these lines are 
structurally inherent to capitalist credit. Because of their significant capacity to boost profitability 
while  simultaneously  rendering  accumulation  more  fragile,  credit  relations  force  capitalism 
constantly to straddle between expanding and curbing the scale of credit. Critical analyses of the 
cyclical  and  historical  limits  of  contemporary  capitalism  will  be  well  served  by  explicit 
consideration of the attendant contradictions. References
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2010Q1Appendix A  |  The Full Model Postulated and Its Steady-State Solutions
Flows
P(t) = C(t')xp(t − t')dt'
−∞
t










C(t) = S'(τ)+ pS''(τ) [ ]xv(t −τ)dτ
−∞
t
∫ +  B(t)   (A.4)
S(t) = C(t)+ (1− p)S''(t)   (A.5)
Stocks
 
 Π(t) = C(t)− P(t)  (A.6)
 
 Ν(t) = P(t)− S'(t)    (A.7)
 
 Μ(t) = S'(t)+ pS''(t)− C(t)−  B(t) ( ) =  B(t)   (A.8)
Which add up to,
 
 Κ(t) = pS''(t)+  B(t)   (A.9)





  (A.10) 
Full Exponential Solutions
Exponential growth paths for all stocks and flows in the model can be normalised to the scale of 
simple reproduction S'(t), yielding
S'(t) = S'(0)e
g(h)t                     (B.1)
Total sales
S(t) = S'(t)(1+ q)                     (B.2) 
Profits
S''(t) = qS'(t)                     (B.3)
Investment
C(t) = 1+ pq [ ]S'(t)                     (B.4)
Output
P(t) = 1+ pq [ ]xp
*(g)S'(t)                   (B.5) 
Money hoards and debt outstanding
M(t) =
1+ pq [ ]
g(h)
1− xv
*(g) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦S'(t) = h
S'(t)
g(h)
= B(t)             (B.6)
Unfinished outputs
Π(t) =
1+ pq [ ]
g(h)
1− xp




*(g)−1 ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
g(h)
S'(t)                (B.8)
Total capital in circulation,
K(t) =
h + pq [ ]
g(h)
S'(t)                    (B.9)Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 4.1 for Discrete-Delay Lag Processes
Under discrete delay lag processes equation (4.30) becomes,
h1
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* = 1+ p0q0 ( )
q1
iv
v0 h0v0 + v1 1+ p0q0 − h0 ( ) ( )ln
1+ p0q0 ( )
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The sign of (B.2) hinges on the sign of, 
h0v0 + v1 1+ p0q0 − h0 ( ) ( )ln
1+ p0q0 ( )




⎠ ⎟ − h0v1   (B.3)




























Since by hypothesis  v0 v1 >1, and the term inside the brackets in (B.4) can be numerically shown 
to be smaller than 1 whenever h >> 0, the  theorem  holds as postulated for exponential-decay lag 
processes. 